By Mark Bareta | Opinion
A response to Mr Okie Hope’s claims about Ambazonia, public opinion and the political future of Southern Cameroons.
Mr Okie Hope raises questions that deserve serious engagement. Have Anglophones become disillusioned with Ambazonia? Has the suffering of the conflict weakened support for independence? Do our different ethnic identities make a shared political future unrealistic? And, if there is a referendum, should each division determine its future separately?
These questions touch the deepest anxieties of a people who have endured violence, displacement, interrupted education and economic hardship. They should be discussed openly. People must be able to question leaders, challenge strategies and express political preferences without being threatened or branded enemies.
However, the argument that “Ambazonia has brought more pain than hope” moves from an undeniable reality—human suffering—to a political conclusion that has not been established: that the population has therefore rejected independence and would prefer the unitary state.
That is the central weakness in Mr Hope’s argument. His prediction that some regions would “beg” to join the unitary state turns exhaustion into an assumed political surrender. In my view, this is fear-driven rhetoric rather than a demonstrated account of public opinion. It deserves a firm response.
I support Ambazonian independence. My argument does not require pretending that everyone agrees with me. It requires recognising that nobody can legitimately substitute their own assumptions for the freely expressed wishes of the people.
If Ambazonia has lost public support, why not let the people decide?
Exhaustion is not a constitutional preference
The strongest part of Mr Hope’s argument is its recognition of suffering. Families have buried loved ones. Children have experienced serious disruption to their schooling. Businesses have collapsed, communities have been displaced, and ordinary routines have become uncertain.
Independence supporters must listen to these experiences without becoming defensive. People should not have to demonstrate political loyalty before their pain is taken seriously.
Yet being exhausted by war does not automatically mean supporting the unitary state.
A parent may demand that schools remain open while supporting independence. A trader may oppose compulsory shutdowns while favouring federalism. A displaced person may condemn the behaviour of an armed group while continuing to reject the political arrangement under which the conflict developed.
These positions reflect the difference between a political objective and the methods used in its name.
When someone says, “I want peace,” the honest response is to ask what conditions would make that peace secure and lasting. We cannot assume that the person has endorsed independence, federalism or continued unitary government.
The desire to survive must never be treated as consent to a particular constitutional settlement.
The crisis did not begin with armed separatism
Mr Hope argues that a legitimate Anglophone grievance was hijacked by a separatist project. That interpretation deserves examination, but it cannot stand as a complete account of the crisis.
The protests that developed in 2016 involved lawyers, teachers and others raising concerns about institutions, language, professional practice and unequal treatment. Human Rights Watch documented the security forces’ response, including killings and hundreds of arrests.
This history matters because the escalation cannot be explained solely through the later conduct of armed separatists. The state’s response to protest forms part of the explanation for how demands for reform developed into a much deeper confrontation.
When people seek institutional protection and encounter repression, confidence in reform can weaken. The political question then changes: can the existing system be corrected, or does it repeatedly defeat the possibility of meaningful change?
That helps explain the appeal of independence. It does not excuse every action taken in its name.
Armed separatist attacks on civilians, schools, teachers and students have also been documented. Such abuses must be condemned and investigated. No political aspiration gives anyone permission to terrorise the population they claim to represent.
An honest assessment must therefore examine state repression, armed-group abuses and the political failures that allowed the crisis to deepen. Assigning all responsibility to “Ambazonia” obscures that history and avoids difficult questions about the conduct of the government.
Federalism must answer the question of guarantees
Many Southern Cameroonians have supported federalism, autonomy or institutional reform. Those positions deserve respect.
However, federalism is not an arrangement our people have never tried.
Southern Cameroons joined the Republic of Cameroun in 1961 within a federal structure. In 1972, that federation was abolished and replaced with a unitary state.
For independence supporters, this history creates a fundamental problem of trust. If a federal arrangement could be removed once, what would prevent another arrangement from meeting the same fate?
Those advocating renewed federalism should explain the safeguards. How would powers be protected? Who would enforce the agreement? What remedies would exist if the central government breached it? Could one political majority remove protections that were essential to securing the agreement in the first place?
Independence supporters face equally demanding questions about their proposed state. Neither side should be exempt from scrutiny.
My position is that Southern Cameroons needs durable control over its institutions and political future. I believe independence offers the strongest basis for that control. But this is a political argument to be presented and tested, rather than a position to be imposed on everyone.
The debate should compare credible arrangements and enforceable guarantees. Simply asking people to trust another promise does not adequately address the experience of the previous federation.
Our diversity does not erase our shared history
Mr Hope rightly observes that our communities have histories that did not begin in 1961.
Bakweri, Bassossi, Moghamo, Nso, Bali and other identities carry their own languages, traditions, institutions and memories. They must be respected. No political movement should demand that people abandon those identities as a condition of belonging.
But the existence of distinct communities does not make a shared political identity impossible.
A person can identify strongly with a village or ethnic community while also belonging to a wider political territory. The relevant question is whether that wider arrangement protects local identities, distributes power fairly and allows people to participate meaningfully.
There is also a historical and institutional basis for discussing Southern Cameroonians collectively. In Kevin Mgwanga Gunme and Others v Cameroon, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognised Southern Cameroonians as a “people”, referring to characteristics including their shared history, linguistic tradition, territorial connection and distinct identity.
That decision must be represented accurately. The Commission did not recognise an independent Ambazonia or endorse secession. It upheld Cameroon’s territorial integrity and called for dialogue.
Nevertheless, the recognition of a distinct people challenges the suggestion that a shared Southern Cameroonian identity is merely an invention imposed by contemporary activists.
The task for Ambazonian politics is to show how that shared identity can accommodate our diversity. A convincing independence project should protect local languages, cultural institutions, minority communities and freedom of political disagreement.
An independent state that silenced its own communities would betray the principles used to justify its creation.
No leader or faction owns the cause
Distrust of leadership is another serious issue raised by Mr Hope.
Where there are allegations of financial misconduct, intimidation, internal violence or decisions that expose civilians to harm, the response must be scrutiny and accountability. Political commitment should never become a shield against questions.
People who raise funds should explain how those funds are used. Leaders who announce policies should explain their purpose, assess their consequences and listen to those who bear the costs.
This is particularly important when discussing lockdowns and compulsory shutdowns. Their impact on food, healthcare, education and household income cannot be dismissed as a minor inconvenience. Political strategy must be judged partly by what it does to the lives of ordinary people.
No diaspora leader, armed commander or organisation owns Southern Cameroons. Leadership is a responsibility to serve, not an entitlement to obedience.
However, rejecting a leader is not necessarily the same as rejecting independence. A person may oppose a particular faction, condemn an armed group or demand different methods while retaining the same constitutional aspiration.
The distinction matters. Otherwise, every leadership failure is treated as proof that the underlying political claim has disappeared.
The proper response to failed leadership is to strengthen accountability, protect dissent and build institutions that do not depend on unquestioning loyalty to individuals.
Independence must be explained in practical terms
Questions about the viability of an independent Ambazonia should be welcomed.
A flag cannot fund a hospital. A declaration cannot, by itself, create employment, rebuild a school or establish an independent judiciary. Those who advocate independence must move beyond the language of aspiration and explain how a state would function.
That means presenting credible proposals for public revenue, education, healthcare, infrastructure, trade and economic recovery. It means explaining how security institutions would be placed under accountable civilian authority and how communities affected by violence would obtain justice.
It also means answering questions about the transition: who would exercise authority, for how long, under what rules, and with what limits?
An independence movement must explain how political opponents would be protected, how elections would be organised and how leaders could be removed peacefully.
These questions do not establish that independence is impossible. They establish the seriousness of the work required.
My support for Ambazonia includes an obligation to demand that preparation. The future we advocate must be assessed by the quality of life, security and freedom it could offer ordinary people.
What the 1961 vote tells us about a future referendum
Mr Hope proposes that each region or division should vote independently and that results should be published separately.
Two different ideas are being combined here.
The first is transparency: publishing local results so that people can inspect how votes were counted. That is entirely compatible with a credible referendum.
The second is territorial decision-making: allowing each division to determine a separate constitutional future. That is a different proposal and requires its own justification.
The historical precedent is important.
In the plebiscite of 11 February 1961, Southern Cameroonians were asked whether they wished to achieve independence by joining Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroun.
The overall result was 233,571 votes for joining Cameroun and 97,741 for joining Nigeria—approximately 70.5 per cent against 29.5 per cent.
The vote was not uniform across the territory. Kumba and Nkambe recorded majorities for joining Nigeria, while the other divisions favoured joining Cameroun.
Yet Kumba and Nkambe did not separately join Nigeria. Southern Cameroons was treated as one territorial voting unit, and the overall majority determined the outcome for the whole territory. Those who preferred Nigeria were bound by that collective result.
This provides a strong historical argument for treating Southern Cameroons as an entity in any future agreed referendum. It does not automatically settle every rule of a future process, but it cannot reasonably be ignored.
Publishing results village by village or division by division would not require separate sovereignty for each village or division. Local counting and an overall territorial outcome can coexist, just as differences in local preferences coexisted within the 1961 result.
Nor should majority rule mean neglecting minority communities. Any settlement must protect those who voted against it. Their rights, security, property and political participation must remain protected.
Claims about public opinion require evidence
The suggestion that some regions would “beg” to join the unitary state is a prediction, not an established finding.
The same standard must apply to independence supporters. We should not claim that every poll demonstrates majority support for independence unless we can identify those polls and examine their methods.
Who was surveyed? How were respondents selected? Were people living in rural communities included? What about refugees and displaced people? Could respondents answer without fear? Were the questions neutral? Did participants represent the population or simply the audience of a particular platform?
An online poll can accurately describe the choices of those who participated while still failing to represent the wider population.
These limitations do not prove that independence lacks support. They mean that competing claims about majority opinion should be treated with care.
Neither a pro-Ambazonia platform nor an anti-Ambazonia platform should assume that its followers constitute the entire electorate. Public opinion must be established through a credible process, rather than inferred from the loudest voices.
Let the people speak freely
A meaningful decision about the future requires conditions in which people can express themselves safely.
That would mean agreed rules, clear political options, independent supervision and protection from intimidation by state forces or armed groups. It would require credible arrangements for refugees and displaced people to participate, alongside transparent counting and a trusted process for resolving disputes.
Supporters of independence, federalism and continued union should be able to explain their proposals openly. Voters should be able to question them without fear.
Mr Hope’s concerns should therefore lead us towards a democratic test of competing claims. If independence has lost its appeal, a credible process would reveal that. If it retains majority support, that outcome should also be taken seriously.
I support Ambazonian independence because I believe Southern Cameroons needs lasting control over its institutions and political future. I also believe that any movement claiming to speak for the people must be accountable to them.
Our people deserve functioning schools, safe communities, livelihoods and a future beyond violence. They deserve to be heard as citizens with political choices, rather than treated as evidence for whichever argument someone wishes to advance.
Their exhaustion must not be mistaken for consent. Their diversity must not be used to deny their shared history. Their criticism of leaders must not be interpreted automatically as rejection of independence.
Mr Hope is entitled to argue against Ambazonia. He has not, however, established that the people have collectively abandoned it. Pain demands an answer; it does not provide a mandate for the unitary state.
If Ambazonia has lost public support, why not let the people decide?
Mark Bareta
